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R E S U M E N 
En el siglo pasado, América Latina experimentó cambios políticos importantes. 
Muchos países de la región –como Argentina y Brasil– se enfrentaron a duros 
gobiernos autoritarios, así como a florecientes democracias. En estos dos países, 
los cambios constantes de los regímenes políticos también provocaron importantes 
cambios institucionales en el poder judicial, particularmente en la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia. Este estudio analiza los cambios institucionales de las Cortes Supremas 
desde una perspectiva comparada. Al observar los casos de Argentina y Brasil, 
se revisará la trayectoria de ambas Cortes Supremas en un escenario político 
violento (1964 - 1985). En particular, se analizarán las formas en que tales Cortes 
fueron alteradas en momentos de regímenes autoritarios. El análisis se centrará 
en los medios utilizados para modificar cada tribunal y los objetivos de estas 
modificaciones. Aunque los casos comparten algunas similitudes, es fundamental 
señalar que cada caso tiene su trayectoria particular. Para entender esto, se 
analizará la transformación institucional de las Cortes Supremas en Argentina y 
Brasil desde una perspectiva histórica, siempre teniendo en cuenta los contextos 
violentos en los que estos cambios suelen ocurrir. 
PALABR AS CLAVE: Corte Suprema, régimen 
autoritário, cambios institucionales, Argentina, Brasil.
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A B S T R A C T
Over the past century, Latin America experienced important political changes. 
Many countries in the region –such as Argentina and Brazil– faced both harsh 
authoritarian governments and flourishing democracies. In these two countries, the 
constant changes of political regimes also brought important institutional changes 
in the Judicial Power, particularly in the Supreme Court. This paper will analyze 
the institutional change of the Supreme Court from a comparative perspective. 
By looking at the cases of Argentina and Brazil, we will review the trajectory of 
both High Courts in a violent political moment (1964 - 1985). In particular, we will 
analyze the ways in which these courts were altered in moments of authoritarian 
regimes. Our analysis will focus on the means used to alter each Court and the 
objectives of these modifications. Although the cases share some similarities, it is 
fundamental to remark that each case has its particular trajectory. To understand 
this, we will analyze the institutional transformation of the High Courts in 
Argentina and Brazil from a historical perspective, always keeping in mind the 
violent contexts in which these changes tend to occur. 
KEY WORDS: Supreme Court, Authoritariam regime, 
Institutional Change, Argentina, Brazil. 
R E S U M O
No século passado, a América Latina viu importantes mudanças políticas. Muitos 
países da região, como a Argentina e o Brasil, enfrentaram severos governos 
autoritários, além de democracias florescentes. Nesses dois países, as mudanças 
constantes dos regimes políticos também provocaram mudanças institucionais 
importantes no Poder Judiciário, particularmente no Supremo Tribunal. Este 
artigo analisa a mudança institucional do Supremo Tribunal numa perspectiva 
comparativa. Com base nos casos da Argentina e do Brasil, analisaremos a trajetória 
de ambos os Tribunais Superiores num cenário político violento (1964-1985). Em 
particular, analisaremos as formas em que esses tribunais foram alterados em 
momentos de regimes autoritários. Nossa análise se focará nos meios utilizados 
para alterar cada Tribunal e nos objetivos dessas modificações. Embora os casos 
compartilhem algumas semelhanças, é fundamental observar que cada caso tem sua 
trajetória particular. Para entender isso, analisaremos a transformação institucional 
dos Tribunais Superiores na Argentina e no Brasil a partir de uma perspectiva 
histórica, sempre considerando os contextos violentos nos quais essas mudanças 
tendem a ocorrer.
PALAVR AS-CHAVE: Supremo Tribunal, regime 
autoritário, mudança institucional, Argentina, Brasil.
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“La persona que amas puede desaparecer. 
Los que están en el aire pueden desaparecer en el aire. 
Los que están en la calle pueden desaparecer en la calle. 
Los amigos del barrio pueden desaparecer, 
Pero los dinosaurios van a desaparecer”.
Charly Garcia 19831
An Approximation
South America currently finds itself in an intense process of 
democratic consolidation and strengthening of the rule of law 
based on a search for memory, truth and justice in context of its 
past authoritarian regimes. In such sense, each country deals with 
their recent violent past on its own way. For the Brazilian case, 
the creation of a truth commission is a sign of progress towards 
the pursuit of truth with the ideal of justice in the horizon . In 
Argentina, the process of investigation and punishment recently 
implemented and approved by the most important institutions of 
democracy leaves behind the limits imposed by the laws of Obediencia 
debida and Punto final. Along this regional development towards the 
pursuit of truth and justice, the revision of what happened during 
1  Artist: Charly García. Song: Los Dinosaurios. LP-Album: Clics Modernos. Year: 1983. 
“The person you love may disappear. Those in the air can disappear in the air. Those in 
the street can disappear in the street. Friends in the neighborhood may disappear, but the 
dinosaurs are going to disappear”.
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the latest civic-military regimes is a challenge that involves all of 
society and that reconstructs the memory of recent tragic processes. 
Observing and understanding the institutional changes that affected 
the High Court in a context of terrorism of State is important to 
deepen our knowledge about this violent period, and analyzing the 
institutional changes of the High Courts is important to understand 
the forms of institutional co-optation by the military. The Hight 
Court has a different institutional participation and production 
(sentences), harming society in the search for the defense of rights 
in a moment of need, urgency and violence. In the present work, 
the trajectories and the institutional changes of the High Courts in 
Argentina and Brazil during their latest civic-military regimes will be 
analyzed; in particular, a qualitative and interdisciplinary study will 
be performed, based on speeches, official documents, legislation, 
and jurisprudence of the Supreme Courts. Secondary sources to 
place events in context, especially in the political arena, will be used. 
The period studied covers from 1976 to 1983 for the Argentinean 
case, and from 1964 to 1985 for the Brazilian case, taking into 
account the entire period of the dictatorship. The present work tries 
to cooperate with the qualitative studies with historical perspective 
about Latin American Supreme Courts.
I. Trajectories, Institutional and 
Change Coalitions
In general, contemporary theories of institutional development 
define change as an abrupt break2; rather than talking about rupture 
and discontinuity, we might begin to see the transformative changes 
that result from the accumulation of a gradual and incremental 
change (Pierson, 2008). Not only are major changes the product 
of large shocks, but they can also result from incremental changes 
2  When I refer to institutional change in general I think of the “Punctuated 
Equilibrum Model” PEM of Stephen Krasner (1984, p.242). That is, institutions are 
characterized by long periods of stability, and periodically they are “punctuated” by a 
crisis that brings an abrupt institutional change, after which the institutions stabilize 
again. As Krasner (1984, p.234) points out: “institutional change is episodic and dramatic 
rather than continuous and incremental”.
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with transformative results (Streeck and Thelen, 2005, p. 9). What 
surprises is the continuities in key characteristics of the institutions 
despite the context of crisis (Thelen, 2004, p. 7). Institutional 
survival often involves an active political renegotiation and high 
doses of institutional adaptation. 
The important thing to note is that an institution might exhibit 
a historical trajectory that is sometimes characterized by surprising 
continuities across periods of historical breakdowns, but these 
continuities also have an important and silent process of change 
through time. As suggested by Thelen (2004), there is no need for a 
deep division between stability and institutional change; sometimes 
institutional changes are abrupt, but some others they are not, and 
eventually they might show a pattern of incremental change through 
political realignments and renegotiation.
Institution building involves the creation of coalitions and the 
mobilization of various social and political actors in support of a 
particular institutional setting. Actors try to interpret or redirect 
institutions in order to achieve advantages or to pursue their own 
goals, interests or rules, which might conflict with their interests or 
those of the institutions themselves. Thus, political renegotiation 
is crucial to understanding the changes over time as institutions 
develop and evolve (Thelen, 2004, p. 31-33). 
The two cases to be compared have similar institutional 
structures, although historically they have opted for different 
paths with unique particularities3.  The disruption, interference, 
influence or interruption of the High Court can occur through 
both formal and informal ways: The former are specific legislation 
whilst the latter are informal, non-legislative arrangements. During 
the institutional development of the High Court, such formal or 
informal arrangements shaped the circumference of the Court; in 
3  In a nutshell: The Supreme Court of the United States served as an inspiration 
for both Argentina and Brazil, which reflects in the construction and in the history 
of the High Courts in both countries. Moreover, both Argentina and Brazil have a 
strong legal tradition in the region, and the Supreme Court is the highest institution 
of a political power as well as acting Constitutional Tribunal in those two countries. 
Both the Argentinian and the Brazilian Court are guardians of the Constitution as 
stated in their constitutions themselves (art. 116 in Argentina’s Constitution, art. 102 in 
Brazil’s Constitution). Both countries are Federal Republics, and the division of power 
is established by both Constitutions (art. 1 in Argentina’s Constitution, art. 1 in Brazil’s 
Constitution). Also, both countries opted for a presidential system, inspired by U.S. 
institutions –yet with local characteristics.
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turn, these changes may affect structures or capabilities. For the first 
case, changing the number of ministers in the High Court, as well 
as the judges themselves, represents a change in structure; for the 
latter, changes in capabilities may include changes in the High Court 
power, such as limiting or increasing the jurisdiction of the Court, 
among others. 
Means
/Objectives
Structure Capacity
Formal
-Altering number of 
members of the HC by 
law or constitutional 
change
-Taking ministers to 
court
-Altering attributions 
or jurisdiction by law or 
constitutional change
-Creating special tribunals
-Constitutional guarantees
Informal
-Political resignations
-Not completing vacant 
positions
-Delaying the 
confirmation of 
designated ministers
-Delaying or not executing 
sentences
 
Table 1. Means and Objectives of Change in the High Court 
Font: elaborated from our database4.
The structure of the Court is what political scientists usually 
observe5, while scholars of constitutional law and political and 
institutional history usually study its capacities. In such a way, 
observing the transformations in both the structures and the 
capacities at once is necessary for us to deeply understand the 
characteristics of each case, as well as their commonalities. If we 
were to compare the Supreme Court with a racing car, changes in 
4  The database was created and developed during my doctoral thesis based on the 
methodology described in the beginning of this work. To deepen the discussion: Del Rio, 
2014.
5  There is currently a long production on the judiciary in Latin America, as a 
case study or compared. In general, the studios observe the structure. As for the field 
of constitutional law, they marginally observe the structure and focus especially on 
constitutional rights and sentences. To deepen the debate, see: Del Rio 2014.
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structure would alter the driver, and changes in capacities would 
affect the engine power. As indicated by Montaigne, different ways 
lead to the same place; nonetheless, the analysis of how matters to us.
II. Argentina: Radical Institutional Change
On March 24, 1976, the Junta of Commanders-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces –composed by General Jorge Videla, Almirante 
Emilio Massera, and Brigadier Héctor Agosti– overthrew the 
constitutional president Martínez de Perón and took over 
government. The dictatorship, a juridical-civic-military complex, 
would rule Argentina from 1976 to 1983 in a self-dominated “Process 
of National Reorganization.” However, differently from previous 
military regimes, this would be the most perfidious and cruel in its 
means and would also produce the biggest transformations in society 
and its institutions. Armed struggle and state terrorism were the 
unfortunate daily landscape. 
As soon as the Military Junta took power,6 law n.21.279 (the 
Statute for the Process of National Reorganization) passed7 and 
dissolved the Congress and the Judicial Power.8 Particularly, law 
n.21.258 concerning the Judicial Power removed all judges of the 
6  Law n.21.256, Article 2, established that a superior official of the Armed Forces 
would be designated by the Military Junta. In brief, four Juntas took power. The first, 
of longest duration and greatest violence (1976-1980), was composed by Jorge Rafael 
Videla, Emilio Eduardo Massera and Orlando Ramón Agosti. The second (1980-1981) 
was integrated by: Roberto Eduardo Viola, Armando Lambruschini, Omar Domingo 
Rubens Graffigna. The third, leading the Falklands War (1981-1982): Leopoldo 
Fortunato Galtieri, Basilio Lami Dozo and Jorge Isaac Anaya. The fourth (1982-1983): 
Cristino Nicolaides, Rubén Franco, Augusto Jorge Hughes. From these Military Juntas, 
the following official were appointed to head the Executive Power: Jorge Rafael Videla 
(March 29, 1976 to March 29, 1981); Roberto Eduardo Viola (March 29, 1981 to December 
11, 1981); Carlos Alberto Lacoste (December 11, 1981 to December 22, 1981); Leopoldo 
Fortunato Galtieri (December 22, 1981 to June 18, 1982); Alfredo Oscar Saint-Jean (June 
18, 1982 to July 1, 1982) y Reynaldo Bignone (July 1, 1982 to December 10, 1983).
7  These documents were: Acta fijando el Propósito y los Objetivos Básicos para el 
Proceso de Reorganización Nacional; Acta para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional; 
Proclama; Bases para la Intervención de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Proceso Nacional, 
Estatuto para el Proceso de Reorganización Nacional.
8  Art. 2º- The Military Junta may, when for reasons of State it considers convenient, 
remove the citizen that represents the President of the Nation, designating its 
replacement through a process to be yet determined. Initially, it may also remove or 
designate the members of the Supreme Court of Justice, the Attorney General, and the 
Fiscal General of the Fiscalía Nacional de Investigaciones Administrativas.
Art. 9º - In order to cover vacancies for Supreme Court justices, the Attorney General and 
the Fiscal General of the Fiscalía Nacional de Investigaciones Administrativas, and the 
President will validate the designations made by the Military Junta. The designations for 
judges in lower courts will be made by the President. 
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National Supreme Court of Justice (CSJN), the Superior Provincial 
Courts, the Attorney General, and suspending until further 
confirmation all of its magistrates and employees.9 Article 5 of this 
law declared: “The magistrates and employees that are designated 
and confirmed, shall take an oath of observance towards the Basic 
Objectives fixed by the Military Junta, the Statute for the Process of 
National Reorganization, and the National Constitution as long as 
the latter does not oppose the former.” This way, not only were all 
the members of the Judicial Power suspended until confirmation, 
but all the newly designated employees had their confirmation 
dependent upon their acceptance of the statute. Still, most 
importantly, the Constitution no longer was endowed with the real 
constitutional supremacy devised in 1853. The kelnesian juridical 
construction was broken. The Constitution would be applied as 
a supplement to the new norms dictated by the Military Junta. In 
the new legislation, no independence remained for the Judicial 
Power; on the contrary, the new laws diminished the institutional 
importance of the Judiciary, removing its fundamental attributions. 
Particularly, the CSJN was no longer a power of the State with 
political attributions. The Judicial Power, in the words of the report 
Nunca Más (1984): “became in fact a simulation of the judicial 
function in order to cover its external image”. The Court would 
comply with and accept the new military norm. 
The established legislative complex left all branches of 
government (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) in the hands 
of the new authorities10, i.e., they held the absolute sum of public 
9  Law n. 21.258. Art. 1: “Cesen en sus cargos los señores jueces de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicia de la Nación...” Art.2 “Cesen en sus cargos los señores miembros de los 
Tribunales Superiores de todas las provincias”. Art. 3 “Decláranse en comisión a la 
totalidad de los magistrados y funcionarios del Poder Judicial...”Art. 5 “ Los magistrados 
y funcionarios que se designen y los que sean confirmados, deberán prestar juramento de 
acatamiento a los Objetivos Básicos fijados por la Junta Militar, Estatuto para el Proceso 
de Reorganización Nacional y la Constitución Nacional en tanto no se oponga a aquella”.
10  Some of the most remarkable fundamental laws would be: Law 21.258, Judicial 
Power – all magistrates and employees could be fired. Law 21.260, Public Employees – 
any employee could be removed for reasons of national security or if associated with 
subversive activities. Law 21.262, Foreign Service – all personnel could be fired. Law 
21.264, Ley de represión del sabotaje. Law 21.269, Communist Party, Socialist Workers 
Party, Workers Party, Trotskist Workers Party, and Marxist-Leninist Communist Party– all 
activities banned, meeting spots closed, and bank accounts and other goods blocked. 
Law 21.272, National Security – penalties for acts of violence against military or security 
personnel, ships, airplanes, or military/security establishments, and for acts of resistence, 
threats, injuries or attempted acts. Law 21.274, Public Employees – arrangements 
for dispensing employees. Law 21.275, National Security – right to leave the country, 
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power doing away with the division of power of the republican 
system. This brings to mind the opportune reflections of 
Montesquieu (2004): “There is no liberty if the power to judge is not 
separated from the Legislative and Executive powers. (…) All would 
be lost if the same man, or same body of principles, be them of the 
nobility or of the people, exercised the three powers”.
With the military coup, Special Tribunals were created to 
judge those people included in the Repression Law. The detained 
were immediately judged without the possibility of being defended 
by civil lawyers. The judgments were held in secret and a military 
official acted as the defendant of the detained (Pereira, 2010, 
p. 199-200). The Penal Code was also altered and the death penalty 
introduced. Like in other Latin American countries –such as 
Brazil–, such measure was never applied, although in Argentina it 
was applied extra-judicially and systematically. The legal plexus in 
place determined the actions of the CSJN: Military authorities would 
strictly supervise questions related to individual liberty and penal 
law, given their supreme objective of National Security. 
The coup in Argentina would deeply violate legality more 
drastically than other military regimes in the region. Learning 
from the failure of the Chamber of Terror of 1971, the military 
implemented extreme measures to ensure the duration of its fight 
against the subversives (Pereira, 2010, p. 205)11. They launched an 
intense struggle against the guerilla and other enemies with no 
legal restrictions and in an extra-judicial manner. Neutralizing 
gave way to exterminating, which distanced the possibility of future 
civil governments for setting free their adversaries; moreover, this 
annulled the future possibility of a counter-offensive against the 
guaranteed by Art. 23 of the Constitution, is suspended. Law 21.276, National Universities 
– change in rules, partial change in Organic Law 20.654. Decree 9, Associations of 
workers, businessmen, and professionals – suspension of union activity. Decree 10, “62 
organizations” – organization prohibited to act. Decree 11, Confederación General 
Económica – intervention in the confederation, bank accounts and patrimonial goods 
blocked. 
11  In 1971, the military regime created the Cámara Federal en lo Penal de la Nación, 
which had a civil nature but shared the same purposes as the military tribunals. It 
would be nominated the Court of Terror, and its objective was to judge the violent acts 
of different armed groups opposed to the regime. The Penal Chamber created a fast, 
specialized, and centralized Court composed by judges who were sympathetic to the 
regime. With the Law 19.081, the military themselves were apt to investigate crimes that 
were within the jurisdiction of the Chamber. In two years, over 300 people accused of 
various political crimes were arrested (Pereira, 2003, p.39).
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militaries. The authoritarian regime tried at all cost an alleged 
irreversible justice, thus the Supreme Court increased popular 
distrust in Justice, given the institutional ineffectiveness in sensitive 
and urgent questions. Institutional changes produced by the coup of 
1976 were immediate and profound, and the capacities of the High 
Tribunal were intensely altered both in shape and extent. 
A. Changes in the Composition of the High Court 
When the military government took power, one of its first acts 
was to declare the compulsory departure of all the members of 
the Supreme Court of Justice. The removed ministers had been 
designated by Cámpora with the avail of Juan Domingo Perón 
in 1973. They represented a political-ideological line that the 
military junta wanted to leave behind. This way, a completely new 
Supreme Court would be designated at the beginning of the new 
government. It is important to note that all of the justices designed 
in this violent period were not confirmed by the Congress, and thus 
had no legitimacy. Initially, the Court of this period was composed 
by: Horacio Heredia, Adolfo Gabrielli, Alejando Caride, Federico 
Videla Escalada, and Abelardo Rossi. To accede to the position, the 
selected ministers of the Court should swear, “according to what is 
prescribed by the basic objectives and the Statute for the Process of 
National Reorganization and the Argentinean Constitution.” Thus, 
the architecture and juridical hierarchy of Argentina would be 
profoundly altered.
During the entire period analyzed, there were modifications 
in the composition of the High Court. Of the 12 members 
designated during the regime, Videla nominated nine. It was also 
during his administration that the deepest period of repression 
took place: during this initial phase, variations in the Court were 
important, reaching eight designations in the two first years. The 
stabilization occurred during the final years of this period. Two 
judges died while in office (Daireaux and Heredia), and two others 
would carry out their functions during the entire authoritarian 
regime (Gabrielli and Rossi). The presidency of the High Court 
was under the responsibility of Heredia until 1978. After that, 
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Gabrielli was the president for the rest of the period. The majority 
of the designated justices had extensive academic and magistrate 
experience. The Court was not composed by ministers with long 
experience in politics; most ministers had a conservative profile 
(Walker, 2006, p. 776). Many authors comment on the trajectories 
and characteristics of the ministers of this period (Carrió, 1996, 
p. 93-94; Ancarola, 1999, p. 137). Nonetheless, without discrediting 
the hard labor of this Court, the few accepted cases (habeas corpus 
especially) were minimized by the avalanche of cases in which the 
Court could not be efficient in the defense of human rights (habeas 
corpus especially). As we can see, it is not about what they did, but 
exactly about what they did not do. The cycle of these magistrates 
ended five days before the beginning of Alfonsín’s constitutional 
presidency, when all the members of the Supreme Court voluntarily 
renounced (Finkel, 2004, p. 62). 
B. Relevant Political Events
Having the horrors of state terrorism as a background, many 
events that impacted the military process took place during this 
period. With the appointment of Martínez de Hoz as Minister of 
Finance and the implementation of a new economic orientation,12 
Argentina would leave behind the few structural successes 
achieved in economic terms, particularly in the industrial sector. 
The substitution of internal production for importation was the 
new norm, which damaged national productive structures. The 
devastating liberal classist economic plan that was implemented was 
justified for it achieved the political objectives of the tra nsformation 
project proposed by the Armed Forces (Canitrot, 1980, p. 461).
12  The central dispositions of the economic plan of 1976 were the following: 1) Fixating 
a new level of real salaries 40% inferior to the average salary of the previous five years. 
2) Eliminating withholdings on exports of agricultural products. 3) Applying a program 
of progressive reduction of the import taxes (opening the economy). 4) Eliminating 
subsidies for non-traditional exports, development credit, deficiary social benefit 
programs (health, housing), real increase in utility rates. 5) Liberalization of exchange 
and financial markets (financial reform) and the financing of the public deficit through 
sale of titles in the capital markets. 6) Reduction in spending, in jobs, and government 
deficit (resizing of the State), re-privatization of companies under state control (principle 
of subsidiarity of the State). (Canitrot, 1980, p.459).
87
A
N
D
R
É
S
 D
E
L
 R
ÍO
In 1978, and with the World Cup taking place in Argentina, 
terrorism of state and armed struggle was in full swing. There 
were many complaints demanding to cancel the event given the 
violations of human rights taking place. That same year, after 
Argentina rejected Britain’s arbitral ruling, the border conflict over 
the Beagle Canal with Chile reached its tensest moment. A year 
later, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) 
visited Argentina. After two weeks of interviews, the IACHR 
disclosed the human rights violations perpetuated in Argentina: 
“The Commission has reached the conclusion that by action or by 
omission of the public authorities and its agents in the Republic of 
Argentina, numerous and grave violations of fundamental human 
rights have been committed during the period covered by this 
report – 1975 to 1979 - …” (OEA – CIDH, 1980). In 1980, Adolfo 
Pérez Esquivel received the Nobel Peace Prize, further exposing 
human rights violations in Argentina internationally and nationally 
legitimizing the activities and demands of human rights movements 
(Acuña y Smulovitz, 1995, p.155)13. At the end of the same year, 
the Pope presented its proposal mediating the border conflict 
with Chile. Amidst the political, economic, and social crisis of the 
military regime, on April 2, 1982, Argentinean troops recovered the 
Falkland Islands. Despite the diplomatic negotiations, conflict broke 
out. The war ended on June 14 with Argentina’s rendition. The fault 
of the failed generals quickly became the fault of the authorities 
of the military regime. The sacrifice of the soldiers, victims of the 
incompetence of their commanders, was converted into the sacrifice 
of the victims of the regime. As Linz and Stepan show (1996), the 
military tried to impose a new game, but it failed drastically in its 
lack of efficiency as well as legitimacy. 
As a consequence of the collapse of the authoritarian regime 
after the loss in the Falklands War, a civil and constitutional 
government returned to power. No political negotiation with the 
Armed Forces over the topic of human rights violations preceded 
the beginning of the new regime. The Armed Forces saw themselves 
13  Among the opposition groups and groups in defense of human rights and liberties 
were: La liga Argentina por los Derechos del Hombre, la Asamblea Permanente por 
los Derechos Humanos (APDH), el Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS), Las 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo, las Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, and many others. 
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forced to hand back power in the worst conditions they could have 
imagined: with no guarantees as to how the new political forces 
would deal with the legacy of the military regime. Differently from 
other cases in the region (such as the Brazilian case), the politicians 
had no incentives to negotiate with the defeated military, which 
had no capacity to influence the political dynamics of the transition 
of power (De Riz, 1990). The defeat in the war marked a point of 
inflexion for the regime, and the call for elections quickly took 
place. Argentina was headed in the difficult task of recovering 
formal institutions of government, fundamental rights, and 
political interaction. 
III. Brazil: Gradual and Transformative 
Institutional Change 
With the coup d’état on March 31, 1964, a civic-military regime 
that would last 21 years began. Differently from other constitutional 
interruptions, this coup did not intend to give away the control over 
Brazilian politics, incorporating the characteristic of permanence. 
With the new regime, individual freedoms and guarantees were 
limited. On April 9, the military junta composed by General Artur 
da Costa e Silva, Liutenant Brigadier Francisco de Assis Correia de 
Melo, and Vice Admiral Augusto Hamann Rademaker Grünewald 
dictated the Institutional Act n.1 (AI). In its first article, the act 
declared: “The Constitution of 1946, the state Constitutions and 
its respective amendments are maintained with the modifications 
established in this Act.” The AI n.1 also granted to the military 
government the authority to revoke legislative mandates, suspend 
political rights for 10 years, and force the retirement of any person 
who has made an attempt against National Security14. Furthermore, 
the act determined indirect presidential election to take place on 
April 11; the mandate shall remain until January 31, 1966.15 Article 7 
stated that “Constitutional or legal guarantees of vitality or stability 
14  In these political scenarios 49 judges were removed (Fausto, 2002, p.467).
15  On April 15, 1964, Castelo Branco was sworn in as President. His mandate would be 
extended until March 15, 1967, through the Constitutional Ammendment n.9 of July 22, 
1964. 
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are suspended for six months,” and item 4, which particularly 
affected the Supreme Federal Court (STF), read: “The jurisdictional 
control of these acts shall be limited to the examination of extrinsic 
formalities, being prohibited the consideration of the facts that 
motivated the act, as well as its convenience or opportunity.” 
Nonetheless, this Institutional Act would not be the last. 
During his presidency, Castelo Branco would try to maintain 
respect towards the STF. After certain decisions of the High Court, 
the hard liners began considering alternatives to this branch of 
government. In an attempt to appease the spirits of these hard 
liners, exasperated by certain judicial decisions of the Court16, 
the government dictated AI n.2 on October 27, 1965, affecting 
particularly the STF. The number of members of the High Court 
increased to 16; constitutional guarantees of vitality, immobility 
and stability were suspended, and article 19 declared that: “Shall 
remain excluded from judicial consideration: I – the acts practiced 
by the Supreme Command of the Revolution and by the Federal 
Government, based on the Institutional Act of April 9, 1964, the 
current Act and on complementary acts; II – the resolutions of 
Legislative Assemblies and Municipal Chambers that have revoked 
mandates or declared the impeachment of Governors, Deputies, 
Mayors or City Counsels, from March 31, 1964 until the date of 
this Act.” Other areas were also affected17. The military had left the 
barracks and were at war against the STF. According to the military 
perception, the branches of government should walk hand in hand 
to endorse the continuity and deepen the revolution.
The Constitution of 1946 saw its end with the AI n.4, on 
December 7, 1966. The act summoned the National Congress to 
16  It is important to note that the decisions not only exasperated certain groups within 
the military, but also many legislators and sectors of the press who saw the High Court in 
disaccordance with the revolutionary mission. The attacks focused specially on Minister 
Hermes Lima and Evandro Lins. The habeas corpus conceded to the Governor of the 
State of Goiás, Borges Teixeira, and to the Ex-Governor of the State of Amazonas, Plínio 
Coelho, were determining. 
17  The AI n.2: installed indirect presidential elections; dissolved all political parties 
and allowed the creation of new ones; established the presidential power to declare a 
state of siege for 180 days without consulting the legislature, to intervene in state politics, 
to declare Congressional recess, to dismiss employees due to incompatibility with the 
regime, and to dictate law-decrees over matters of national security. Furthermore, the 
President reserved the right to send constitutional ammendments to Congress, which 
had 30 days to appreciate the ammendments and approve them with a majority of both 
legislative houses. 
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discuss, vote and promulgate the proposed Constitution presented 
by the President. According to the military government, “only a 
new Constitution can guarantee the continuity of the revolution”. 
The current legal mess had gotten out of control, and the new 
Constitution sought normalization in a sense. In November 
1965, the Constitutional Amendment n.16 would profoundly 
alter the Judicial Power18. Federal Justice was institutionalized, 
as had been announced in the AI n.4. Still, the amendment 
allowed the STF to judge federal laws or acts by means of the 
representation of the Attorney General. The constitutional control 
was strengthened. In addition to the already present diffused 
control, a concentrated control was instituted (Dias Corrêa, 1987). 
As Vilhena Vieira suggests: 
The problem appears in the form through which active 
legitimacy was configured, that is, the capacity to provoke the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Such legitimacy, attributed 
with exclusivity to the Attorney General, dismissible ad nutum by 
the President, became an instrument of little value in controlling 
the institutional acts produced by the Executive or in its interest.” 
(1994, p. 79).
The new constitutional text came into effect together with 
the swearing in of Costa e Silva as president, on March 15, 1967. 
The flaming fundamental text tried to institutionalize and legalize 
the military regime in a more harmonious way, leaving behind the 
judicial mutilation of the first years of government. Nonetheless, 
National Security being its main objective, constitutional guarantees 
would be profoundly affected, especially individual freedoms19. The 
more the revolution was institutionalized, the more it distanced 
itself from democracy. Habeas corpus and writ of mandamus were 
established, although the former would not always be effective 
when relating to crimes against National Security. The decree-laws 
18  Some purges in the Judiciary took place in this phase (Pereira, 2010).
19  Regarding the guarantees given to the judges, the new Constitution established, in 
article 108: “With the exemption of the restrictions expressed in this Constitution, the 
Judges shall enjoy the following guarantees: […] III – irreduc bility of salary, subject, 
however, to general taxes. § 1 º - Retirement shall be compulsory at 70 years of age or for 
proven disability, and optional after thirty years of public service, in all of these cases with 
full salaries.” 
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played an important role as a government tool; article 58 established: 
“The President of the Republic, in cases of urgency or relevant public 
interest, and as long as it does not result in increases in expenses, 
may issue decrees with the force of law over the following subjects: I – 
national security; II – public finances”. Nonetheless, the Constitution 
of 1967 would coexist with institutional acts and other legal 
instruments that appeared over time, constantly eroding its power.  
On one hand, the country went through a favorable economic 
situation (with high concentration of benefits, though); on the other, 
political opposition, social manifestations (particularly workers 
and students), and acts of violence multiplied. On October 1968, 
the Higher Censorship Council (Conselho Superior de Censura) was 
created (Fico, 2004, p. 212). The military elite noticed that in spite 
of the measures in place to insure order, these had not produced the 
expected effect, which created the necessity for deeper measures. 
In this context, the authoritarian model darkened on December 13, 
1968, with the AI n.5. Dictated by President Arthur Costa e Silva, the 
Institutional Act n.5 gave ample power to the government to repress 
the opposition: the National Congress was shut down (following the 
Complementary Act N. 3820), democratic mandates were revoked, 
political rights of any citizen could be suspended for a period of ten 
years, federal government could intervene in states and municipalities, 
good could be confiscated in case of unlawful enrichment, and habeas 
corpus for political crimes against National Security and the socio-
economic order was suspended. After the AI n.5, the authoritarian 
regime increased repression and would use detention, torture and 
murder against its enemies or those considered as such. For example, 
in January 1969 forty-three congressmen were arrested. In July, the 
Operation Bandeirantes was created, a center for repression located 
in São Paulo. And in September, the new National Security law, which 
included the death penalty, was approved. 
The Institutional Act n.6 from February 1969 would make 
the Supreme Court the target one more time. First, the number of 
ministers was reduced to eleven and, as a consequence, ministers 
Evandro Lins, Hermes Lima, and Vitor Nunes Leal were pushed 
20  Article 1 established: “In the terms of art. 2, and its paragraphs, of the Institutional 
Act n.5, from December 13, 1968, Congressional recess is declared, from this date.”
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into forced retirement. Minister Gonçalves de Oliveira renounced 
in solidarity. Still, Minister Lafayette de Andrada was removed. The 
Supreme Court was renovated almost in its entirety. The AI n.6 also 
altered the capacities of the STF, increased those of the Supreme 
Military Tribunal, and ratified all constitutional amendments 
created through Complementary Acts after the AI n.5. According 
to article four of AI n.6, “All acts performed in accordance with this 
Act and its Complementary Acts, as well as their effects, are excluded 
from judicial review”. The STF was being pushed aside from its 
vital functions as an institution. This way, the government avoided 
jurisdictional control and appreciation of law, although at cost of its 
legitimacy (Rosa, 1985). The STF had a new institutional status, with 
a more restricted role and a renovated composition. As Vale (1976, 
p. 166) suggests: “Since then, especially with the Acts numbers 5 and 
6, conflicts ceased, and the Executive-Revolutionary Power found in 
the Supreme Court an administratively healthy organ, technically 
agile, [...] but politically dead.” In the same line, Vilhena Vieira 
(1994) argues that as its capacities were reduced and its ministers 
altered, the STF no longer offered resistance to the regime. 
Still, the modifications continued: on October 17, 1969, 
Constitutional Amendment n.1 was declared, and would make 
clear that power would be concentrated in the Executive branch: 
“Considering that, and given that a parliamentary recess has been 
decreed, the Executive Federal Power is authorized to legislate over 
all subjects, according to clause § 1º of article 2nd of the Institutional 
Act n. 5, of December 13, 1968.” The amendment was extensive in 
the modifications it introduced to the 1967 Constitution. Not few 
authors admit that it served the purpose of a new constitution. 
The Amendment n.1 –in addition to the AI n.5– intensified the 
concentration of power in the Executive and consolidated the legal 
juridical architecture of the military regime. From the structure 
of the Constitution of 1946, the modifications of the Constitution 
of 1967 and the constitutional amendment –or new constitution– 
of 1969 were introduced. Despite of increasing authoritarianism, 
certain liberal forms of governmental organization were not 
completely altered –the legislative and judicial powers remained– 
nor were citizen rights completely annihilated, although these would 
be restricted to its maximum.
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With the swearing in of Médici as head of the Executive Power, 
a duality was momentarily installed. The economic development 
had important consequences in the process of legitimization of the 
violent regime. As Gaspari (2002, p. 18) indicates, “The economic 
miracle was simultaneous to the repression and the armed struggle. 
Both real, they coexisted and denied each other”. Between the 
governments of Costa e Silva and Médici, repression would reach 
its maximum expression in the armed struggle: during this period, 
there were more than 300 disappeared, 25,000 political prisoners, 
10,000 exiles, and over 7,378 people judged by military courts for 
political crimes (Pereira, 2003).21
With the Geisel government, there was an attempt at a process 
of normalization, but the economic crisis altered the initial plans. 
The military regime started to lose support from the middle and 
high classes, which had previously sustained it. In 1974, the regime 
met an electoral, and in 1977 the constitutional amendment n.7 
increased the capacities of the STF (Dias Corrêa, 1987, p. 17). 
The process of political opening presented many scenarios, 
yet the military questions would be predominant. This way, the 
process was set to be a slow one. In June 1978, AI n. 5 was lifted, and 
in October of that same year the constitutional amendment n.11 
brought back parliamentary guarantees and reorganized the party 
system. In March 1979, Figueiredo assumed the presidency. On 
August 22 of that year, the Amnesty Law was approved; the Law was 
restricted to those involved in political crimes,22 although later, with 
the support of the Supreme Court, it was converted into a bilateral 
amnesty that benefited in an ample, general and unrestricted 
manner the members of the authoritarian regime23. The Law 
21  In brief but clear words, Soares (1994, p.29) shows that: “facts confirm that 
political repression was concentrated in 1964, and later in the years from 1969 to 1973. 
This repression was distributed throughout all sectors of national life, including military, 
civilians, and parts of the State. However, regarding the question of the dissapeared, 
the killed, and the abused, the majority these acts appears in the second moment. 
More than this, we want to call to attention the fact that what changed in this second 
phase was the target of repression, involving sectors of the social and cultural national 
elites, the improvement of methods, the institutionalization and organization of the 
repressive system...”
22  The Amnesty Law n.6.683-1979 exposed the internal disagreement amongst the 
military on the liberal measures taken during the period of transition (Soares, D’Araujo e 
Castro, 1995). Currently, the amnesty law is being strongly debated, recently reaching the 
STF in a lawsuit demanding its revision. The Supreme Court’s early arguments were not in 
favor of the revision of the law.
23  As Abrão (2011, p. 123) shows: “... the social pressure for the investigation of crimes 
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passed through a process that was controlled by the regime, giving it 
a meaning of political-social agreement to co-opt the fact that it had 
only partial legitimacy. This supposed legitimacy was strengthened 
with time, based on the legality of the law conceded by the Supreme 
Court. The prolonged transition towards redemocratization in Brazil, 
as well as the negotiation of diverse sectors and the military, would 
have serious impact in the future regarding the punishment for 
crimes committed during this period. With relation to the transition 
and action of the STF, Vilhena Vieira (1994, p. 81) states: “The 
Supreme Court collaborated towards the transition in the rhythm 
established by the agenda of the government. In diverse episodes in 
which the Supreme Court was sought after, the litigants had their 
pretentions frustrated by a court submissive to the will of the military.” 
At last, as we may observe during the course of the period being 
analyzed, the civic-military regime constantly altered the capacities 
of the High Court until they achieved to create a Supreme Court 
in accordance with the power and objectives of the illegitimate 
government. These modifications in capacities were gradual, albeit 
cumulative, thus succeeding to institutionally transform the role of 
the High Court within the national political scenario.   
A. Composition of the STF During the 
Military Regime: 1964 – 1985
With the military regime in place, the Supreme Federal Court 
slowly turned into an uncomfortable institution for the objectives 
of the revolution. In spite of the fact that part of the ministers 
recognized the respect of President Castelo Branco towards the 
court, it was during his presidency that interventions in the court 
began. This trajectory deepened until the new regime achieved to 
create a Supreme Court in accordance to its wills; differently from 
the Argentinean case, however, the modifications in the High Court 
happened gradually, not abruptly. In order to calm the spirits of 
increased, which led the Judiciary – note: controlled by the regime – to systematically 
and interpretevly expand the spectrum of the scope of the Law, considering the crimes 
committed by agents of the State as “related to political crimes,” and, moreover, applying 
the Law even to crimes occured post-1979, outside its temporal validity (such as the 
Riocentro case in 1980), under the guise of the principle of ‘national pacification’”.
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the harsher sectors of the military, Castelo Branco implements the 
Brazilian Court Packing, increasing to 16 the number of members 
of the court with the AI n.2 of October 27, 1965. Thus, five ministers 
were designated and sworn in on November 25 of the same year. 
This number was maintained by the Constitution of 1967. The 
designated ministers were Adalício Coelho Nogueira, José Eduardo 
do Prado Kelly, Oswaldo Trigueiro de Albuquerque Mello, Aliomar 
de Andrade Baleeiro, and Carlos Medeiros Silva. According to 
Minister Hermes Lima, the designations had honored the court, 
granting it independence and quality (Vale, 1976).
Nonetheless, the increase in number of members and the 
designation of ministers did not cause the effect the military had 
expected. On December 13, 1968, based on the Institutional Act 
n.5, three ministers were forced into compulsory retirement, leaving 
their positions in January, 1969; in solidarity, Minister Antonio 
Gonçalves de Oliveira resigned in February of that very year. 
Minister Antonio Carlos Lafayette de Andrada also resigned in the 
same period. The AI n.6 re-established the number of ministers to 
eleven. The three ministers who were compulsory removed were 
Evandro Lins, Hermes Lima, and Vitor Nunes Leal. All had had an 
active participation in defense of the Constitution. 
During the authoriatian regime, 32 ministers were designated 
to the High Court, of which 12 were designated during the first 
four years of the regime. Undoubtedly, the intervention over the 
STF had succeeded in renovating its composition, although these 
changes in structure were simply complementary to the changes in 
the institutional role of the High Court established by the legislated 
implemented during the regime.
Regarding the Presidents of the High Court, it is worth paying 
attention to the three first.  These were the only ministers nominated 
in democratic moments: Minister Ribeiro da Costa designated by 
Linhares, Minister Luiz Gallotti by Dutra, and Minister Gonçalves 
de Oliveira by Juscelino Kubitschek. It was during these presidencies 
that the STF experienced its greatest interferences and changes, 
and these presidents did not fail to show their dissatisfaction. After 
these presidencies, the role of the STF was diminished as was the 
importance of the president of the High Court. Definitely, the 
modifications in the structure of the court deepened with time: on 
one hand its size was modified, and on the other its composition 
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was changed. Once the military achieved to have the type of 
Supreme Court they wished for, institutional changes in this area 
were minimal. Given the strategic importance of these institutional 
changes in the structure of the High Court, it is important to note 
that followed two fundamental characteristics: In the first place, 
these changes were gradual and never radical or abrupt like in 
the Argentinean case; secondly, they were complementary to the 
institutional changes in the capacities of the High Court. It might be 
for this reason that the modifications in the structure were gradual, 
since they were complementary and cumulative with the objective of 
achieving a solid institutional transformation. 
IV. Conclusions
Throughout the institutional development of the Supreme Courts 
of Argentina and Brazil during their respective military regimes, 
constant changes happened over time. Some were the result of 
an accumulation of gradual and incremental changes (Pierson, 
2008), whilst others were the product of abrupt institutional 
change. As these cases show, major changes can happen alongside 
a strong sense of institutional continuity. After re-democratization, 
these continuities become important authoritarian legacies in 
democracy24. Given the extensive possibilities of types of changes, 
this paper observed changes in structure as well as in capacity of the 
High Courts, always within the political and historical context in 
which they happened. The result is an analysis of the development 
of the Supreme Court through its institutional changes during 
authoritarian regimes.
To begin with, this paper noted the difference in the temporal 
period studied in each case: the civic-military regime lasted seven 
years in Argentina, while in Brazil the regime lasted three times 
as long, for 21 years. This temporal difference suggests different 
24  To deepen the debate of authoritarian legacies in democracy, see for the Brazilian 
case: Del Rio, Andrés. Ditadura, Democracia e Justiça Transicional no Brasil: Trajetória 
e Legados do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Dados [online]. 2014, vol.57, n.4. For the 
Argentinean case, see: Del Rio, Andrés. La dictadura argentina en el banquillo: 
la trayectoria de la justicia y punición a los responsables por los crímenes de lesa 
humanidad. Política, Globalidad y Ciudadanía. Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León Vol 1 
Núm 1. enero-junio, 2015.
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meanings. Nonetheless, what is important about this difference 
is that it clearly exposes the degree and pace of the institutional 
changes in each case. It shows the Brazilian gradualism and the 
Argentinean rupture. It was during a period of five years that Brazil 
went through the institutional changes that finally transformed the 
institutional architecture of the Supreme Court and distilled its 
institutional role. If we consider five years in the Argentinean case, 
we are referring to over 70% of the military regime. In this case, the 
main institutional changes already had been implemented in less 
than six months. 
In both cases, institutional changes produced through 
modifications in the capacities or structure transformed the role of 
the High Court. In this sense, the court was an institution devoid of 
strength or tools vital to its function. Moreover, in both cases, this 
lack of strength profoundly affected the role of the Supreme Court 
in the defense of human rights, in the context of systematic human 
rights violations as a consequence of state-sponsored terrorism. 
The courts did not channel social demands for human rights 
violations, rejecting habeas courps and obstructing investigations. A 
fundamental role was absent in a moment of extreme need. For each 
case, this violent context has unique characteristics: in Brazil, it was 
important for the regime to maintain a certain democratic disguise; 
in Argentina, the military opted for illegality in its pure state, and 
the extrajudicial execution materialized in the forced disappearance 
of citizens. As a similarity, in the realm of human rights both cases 
exhibit a High Court with little importance and ineffectiveness 
regarding the defense of basic rights. In order to enrich our 
comparative perspective, we will analyze the modifications 
produced in the High Courts of each case study, noting similarities 
and individualities. 
A. Changes in Capacities
In the Brazilian case, with the coup of 1964, the new regime 
established a dictatorship with a democratic and legal disguise. 
There were many changes in the capacities of the High Court, each 
with a different depth and extent. The attributions and capacities 
arising from the Brazilian legislation, Constitutional and national, 
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were modified repeatedly. These ended up molding an STF with 
little power and diminished in its institutional role within the 
political system. For example, the Institutional Acts n.5 and 6 (1968 
and 1969) seriously affected the STF. The AI n.6 established, in 
its article 4, that: “All the acts practiced in accordance with this 
Institutional Act and its Complementary acts, as well as its effects, 
are excluded from any judicial appreciation.” In addition, while 
the capacities of the court were increased at certain points, these 
had limited effects. The amendment of 1977 is a clear example. In 
particular and exceptional cases, there were sentences that were not 
executed by the government. In Brazil, the stability of the structure 
of the STF was given ultimate importance, but in order not to run 
any risks with its members, governments altered its capacities and 
even its institutional role. These changes in capacities were the 
principal strategy in the Brazilian case, and also served as a type of 
insurance for changing political regimes. 
A remarkable characteristic of the Brazilian case was the 
modifications in capacity, which happened in a gradual and constant 
form. The rhythm of the changes was gradual and cumulative, 
and with time these changes solidified into important institutional 
transformations affecting the institutional role of the Supreme 
Court. The Brazilian gradual, cumulative, and constant changes 
were implemented in many different ways: institutional acts, decrees, 
constitutional ammendments, and even through new constitutions. 
This de facto formality or legality was lacking legitimacy. The 
military governors were determined to maintain at least a façade of 
legality (Acuña y Alonso, 2001, p. 17). This judicial bipolarity of the 
regime (de facto legislation with democratic pretensions) would be 
extinguished with the implementation of the AI n.5, which legally 
unmasked the ruling authoritarism. 
In the Argentinean case, the development of the High 
Court followed a different trajectory in which the interventions 
in its capacities were not the main or only feature. Institutional 
breakdown and modifications of the hierarchy of the legal structure 
did alter the capacities of the High Court. The coup of 1976 is good 
example of a moment when the changes in capacities were deep, 
and also especially extreme. Law No. 21.258 of 1976, art. 5, declared 
that: “The magistrates and employees that are designated and confirmed 
shall take an oath of compliance towards the Basic Objectives as stated by 
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the Military Junta, the Statute for the Process of National Reorganization, 
and the National Constitution, as long as the latter is not oppose to the 
former documents.” In this sense, the modification of the Kelsen 
legal pyramid led to extreme abrupt changes in the Argentinean 
Supreme Court, giving this Court a new, smaller, institutional role. 
The loss in attributions multiplied the feeling of a functional and 
weak institution. The lack of defense of human rights by the Court 
was an example of its real incapacity as a judicial institution. During 
the period in which massive disappearances took place, the judicial 
power became an almost irrelevant resource. The modifications 
in the capacities of the High Court were emphatic and abrupt, 
eliminating the necessity for constant readjustments. Gradual 
processes were not needed, given the rupture in legality produced by 
the coup of 1976. But the Supreme Court was not the only institution 
affected: it followed the same luck as all the other state institutions, 
as a result of the de-prioritization of national legislation. 
B. Changes in Structure
When changes in structure were analyzed, we focused especially 
in the modifications in the size of the High Court and in its 
composition. In the Brazilian case, with the implementation of 
the AI n.2 of October 27, 1965, the number of ministers increased 
from 11 to 16. This was considered an attempt at a Brazilian Court 
Packing. Five ministers were designated, taking office on November 
25 of that same year. The total number of ministers was maintained 
by the Constitution of 1967. On February 1, 1969, the Institutional 
Act n.6 reduced from 16 to 11 the number of members in the 
Supreme Court. As a consequence, three ministers were forced to 
retire: Evandro Lins, Hermes Lima, and Vitor Nunes Leal. Following 
that, Minister Gonçalves de Oliveira resigned in solidarity and 
Minister Lafayette de Andrada was removed. It is important to 
note that all of the removed ministers had been designated during 
democracy. Thus, the Supreme Court was renovated almost in its 
entirety, leaving only Justice Gallotti as a minister who has been 
designated during a democratic period. The military pushed away 
those whose interpretations did not meet revolutionary ends. 
Through a gradual process, the Court was purified of the ministers 
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that bothered the illegitimate government. The increase or decrease 
in number of ministers of the High Court was implemented by the 
civic-military regime jointly with the designation of new members 
or forced removal of others. In this sense, as these constant and 
gradual changes in structure accumulated, they ended up producing 
significant transformations in the institution of the Supreme Court 
and renovating it almost in its entirety. Small, constant modifications 
had a transformative power and produced important change 
(Pierson, 2008), which in the end re-oriented the objective of the 
Brazilian High Court. 
On the other hand, in the Argentinean Case, the Supreme 
Court was composed by five ministers, a number that was kept 
constant throughout the entire period. This apparent and alleged 
stability in the size of the High Court had a direct cause: with the 
arrival of the civic-military government, all of the ministers were 
forcedly removed from their position. Thus, the characteristic in 
focus is the radicalism in the illegal and informal removal of the 
Supreme Court Justices. The complete renovation of the members of 
the High Court was thus an effective measure to achieve the desired 
institutional re-orientation sought by the authoritarian regime. It 
is important to note that this forced and compulsory renovation 
of ministers was a strategy used by de facto Argentinean regimes in 
other points in history: 1955, 1966, and 1976 (case in question). 
The Argentinean case presents a particularity: with the return to 
democratic regimes, the (de facto) judges willingly resigned. This 
occurred in 1958, 1962, 1973 and in 1983. It is important to keep 
in mind that political trial against supreme justices had only been 
used once before the military regime in point. During the first 
Perón government, four members of the CSJN were sent to trial, 
although one of them would resign before the end of the process. In 
this context, the radicalism, depth, and swiftness in the changes in 
structure of the High Court after the coup of 1976 is notable. 
Both cases show an important issue related to the new 
designations and compulsory removals: with new designations as 
well as with the obligatory removals, the ministers were not subject 
to a formal process of designation and removal nor to a process of 
political trial, deepening problems of institutional legitimacy. 
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C. Unique and Shared Characteristics
As seen, every actor tries to interpret or re-direct institutions to 
achieve advantages towards the fulfillment of their own objectives 
or interests. Observing the changes in coalitions is important 
for institutions rely on them (Thelen, 2004, pp. 31-33). In the 
Brazilian case, the Supreme Federal Court was an institution that 
was constantly re-directed and re-molded in a gradual manner to 
meet the new necessities of the authoritarian coalition in power. In 
this case, the accumulation of small institutional changes ended 
up significantly transforming the institutional role of the Supreme 
Court in the national scenario. Meanwhile, in the Argentinean case, 
radicalism was the main feature in the measures taken to re-design 
institutions to achieve the interests of the authoritarian regime. 
Breakdown immediately provoked the desired institutional changes. 
There was no gradualism in the execution of these changes; on 
the contrary, even the end of the military regime would be abrupt. 
In these authoritarian processes, each country had particular 
characteristics, although in both cases the outcome was a profound 
change in the High Court. Finally, with the return to democracy, 
each Court faced new challenges, as a result of the institutional 
inter-relations of democratic processes. 
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